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l 
RICHARD PRINCE, AUTHOR OF THE CATCHER IN THE 
RYE: TRANSFORMING FAIR USE ANALYSIS 
INTRODUCTION 
One day in the fall of 2011, a man unrolled a blanket on a 
sidewalk by Central Park, laid out multiple copies of a book, and 
started selling them for forty dollars apiece.
1 
The man was the no­
torious appropriation artist Richard Prince, and the books for sale 
were near-duplicates of an early edition of The Catcher in the Rye 
by J.D. Salinger.
2 
They were "near-duplicates" for one very obvi­
ous reason: on the dustcover, title page, and copyright page, 
Prince's name appeared in place of Salinger's.
3 
As it turns out, 
these books were part of Prince's latest art project-500 meticu­
lously constructed copies of The Catcher in the Rye using thick, 
high quality paper meant to mimic the 1951 original, the same 
cover art as the original, and most astonishingly, the same text as 
the original (in its entirety).
1 
Prince's appropriation of The Catcher in the Rye was­
especially at that time-a daring artistic choice.
5 
He had just lost 
l. See Kenneth Goldsmith, Richard Prince's Latest Act of Appropriation: The Catcher
in the Rye, POETRY FOUND. (Apr. 19, 2012), http://www.poetryfoundation.org/harriet/ 
2012/04/richard-princes-la test-act-of-appropriation -the-catcher-in -the-rye/. 
2. Several articles have referred to the Richard Prince versions as duplicates of the 
first edition (and not only an early edition) of The Catcher in the Rye by J. D. Salinger. See, 
e.g., id.; Thomas Hawk, Richard Prince on Appropriating "The Catcher in the Rye", 
THOMAS HAWK'S DIGI'l'AL CONNECTION (June 17, 2013, 12:59 PM), http://thomashawk. 
com/2013/06/richard-prince-on-appropriating-the-catcher-in-the-rye.html. For a variety of 
bibliographic reasons this is incorrect. For instance, true first editions of The Catcher in
the Rye had a photograph of J.D. Salinger on the rear panel of the dust jacket. First Edi­
tion Criteria and Points to Identify The Catcher in the Rye by J.D. Salinger, FEDPO.COM, 
http://www.fedpo.com/BookDetail.php?bk=213 (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). In later printings 
this feature was dropped. Michael Lieberman, Richard Prince: Book Pirate?, BOOK PA'l'IWL 
(Apr. 23, 2012), http://bookpatrol.net/richard-prince-book-pirate/. The Prince copies have a 
blank rear panel. See id. (noting that Prince's version used the second issue dust jacket 
which lacks J.D. Salinger's photo). 
3. Goldsmith, supra note 1.
4. See Hawk, supra note 2. 
5. See Goldsmith, supra note 1.
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a copyright case several months earlier in front of a federal dis­
trict court.6 He had been found guilty of misappropriating for his 
visual art series, Canal Zone, multiple photographs of Rastafari­
ans published by Patrick Cariou, a relatively unknown photogra­
pher.7 However, with his The Catcher in the Rye project, Prince 
was appropriating the work of an author who was far from un­
known. Indeed, few twentieth century novels are better known 
than The Catcher in the Rye, and few authors have more fiercely 
defended their copyrighted works than J.D. Salinger.8 Salinger 
successfully sued to enjoin the publication of a derivative work of 
fiction that used characters and plot lines from The Catcher in the 
Rye and a critical biography that quoted liberally from un­
published letters he had written.9 At first blush, Richard Prince's 
appropriation appears so egregious by comparison to these two 
infringers that Prince seems to be "practically begging the estate 
of Salinger to sue him" (though, as of this writing the estate has 
yet to do so).10
It is striking that in both of his copyright infringement victo­
ries, Salinger won after overcoming the "credible fair use defens­
es" of the accused infringers.11 The fair use doctrine protects cer­
tain copying of original expression by allowing "courts to avoid 
rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it 
would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to fos­
ter."12 And yet, what constitutes the fair use of copyrighted mate­
rial has never been strictly defined either by the courts or by the 
6. Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 342-43 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
7. Patrick Cariou had published Yes Rasta, a book of photographs, in 2000. See id. at
343, 355. The decision of the Southern District Court of New York would later be reversed 
in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part by the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 695 (2d Cir. 2013); see infra Part II.B. 
8. See Kate O'Neill, Copyright Law and the Management of J.D. Salinger's Literary
Estate, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 19, 21-22 (2012). 
9. See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 71-72, 83-84 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that 
Frederick Colting had infringed on Salinger's copyrighted material in The Catcher in the 
Rye with his derivative work, 60 Years Later: Coming Through the Rye, which features 
Holden Caulfield as an old man); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 
1987) (holding that biographer, Ian Hamilton, had infringed Salinger's copyright in cer­
tain unpublished letters by quoting them extensively). 
10. Goldsmith, supra note 1.
11. O'Neill, supra note 8, at 20-21.
12. Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d 
Cir. 1980). 
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Copyright Act of 1976. 13 The statute does, however, list four fac­
tors courts must consider when presented with fair use as a de­
fense to copyright infringement: (1) the purpose of the use; (2) the 
nature of the source; (3) the amount and substantiality of the 
source that is used; and (4) the potential impact of the use on the 
market for the source. 14 This list is non-exclusive and seemingly 
designed to give judges broad leeway to determine fair use on a 
case-by-case basis. 10 
The Copyright Act's lack of direction on fair use has led to hap­
hazard application by the courts, which tend to overemphasize 
one or the other of the factors while ignoring or marginalizing the 
others.
16 
A framework for applying the factors consistent with the 
concept behind fair use is necessary to ensure that the goal of 
copyright protection, to promote "the Progress of Science and use­
ful Arts," is met rather than frustrated. 17 At the heart of fair use 
rests the concept of transformative use; that is, in order for crea­
tive expression to be copied and used fairly, it must somehow be 
transformed.
18 
That is all well and good, but determining what 
degree of transformation is necessary to rise to the level of fair 
use has not proven such an easy task for the courts. 
When they have considered transformation at all, courts have 
read the first of the four fair use factors-the purpose of the use­
as the factor determining whether the copying of the source's cre­
ative expression has been transformative.
19 
This is reductive. Ra­
ther than considering it as a single factor, courts should fully in­
tegrate the concept of transformative use into the analysis of fair 
13. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A]
(Matthew Bender rev. ed., 2014). 
14. 17 u.s.c. § 107 (2012).
15. See NIMMER, supra note 13. Though the list is non-exclusive, courts have not come
up with any other factors to include. 
16. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
17. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
575 (1994). 
18. See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111
(1990) (finding that the first factor "raises the question of justification .... This question 
is vitally important to the fair use inquiry, and lies at the heart of the fair user's Clise .. .. 
I believe the answer to the question of justification turns primarily on whether, and to 
what extent the challenged use is transformative"). 
19. See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 708 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding that when the
purpose of the use-the first factor of 17 U.S.C. § 106-is found to be transformative, the 
remaining three factors of 17 U.S.C. § 106 are less significant to the overall fair use analy­
sis). 
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use by using the four factors to determine the following: (1) the 
extent to which the given use is transformative and (2) whether 
the given use is transformative enough in the given case to quali­
fy as fair use. 
In order to present a fair use defense, the defendant must have 
copied the creative expression of a work with a valid copyright.20 
Only then does the court consider whether the copied material 
has been used fairly, in a transformative manner. As both copy­
ing and transformation occur at the same time with fair use, it is 
little wonder that the doctrine is misunderstood. Perhaps the 
most confusing aspect of transformative use is that a source work 
may be copied textually and yet transformed contextually. This 
sort of transformation is the bailiwick of appropriation artists like 
Richard Prince. Such an extreme example of copying as Prince's 
The Catcher in the Rye helps to reveal the nature of transforma­
tive use, which in turn clarifies the fair use doctrine as a whole. 
This comment argues that fair use analysis should be reor­
ganized from a disjointed four-factor morass into a straightfor­
ward two-part analysis that incorporates and clarifies the pur­
pose of each of the four factors. Such a structure recognizes the 
role transformative use plays within the fair use doctrine as a 
whole. This comment then applies this process to a potential fair 
use defense for Richard Prince's The Catcher in the Rye.
21 
Part I 
provides background information on the relationship between the 
author, reader, and text as outlined by Roland Barthes, general 
copyright law, Richard Prince, and the fabulist Jorge Luis Borges. 
Part II analyzes current thinking on the relationship between 
transformative use and fair use by focusing on the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's 2013 decision in Cariou 
v. Prince
22 
and its subsequent criticism by the Seventh Circuit in
Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC.
23 
Part III lays out a new two-part
method for analyzing fair use based on transformative use and
20. William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit, Presump­
tions, and Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 698 (1992); see Harper & Row Pub­
lishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985) (finding that a magazine's use of 
"verbatim excerpts from [an] unpublished manuscript was not a fair use"). 
21. At the time of this writing, no suit has been initiated over Richard Prince's appro­
priation of J.D. Salinger's The Catcher in the Rye. See supra note 10 and accompanying 
text. 
22. 714 F.3d 694. 
23. 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014).
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incorporating the four factors, and then applies that method to 
Richard Prince's appropriation of J.D. Salinger's The Catcher in 
the Rye. This comment concludes by noting that even the total 
appropriation of highly creative expression may be a fair use in a 
given circumstance if what is copied is contextually transformed. 
I. TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF 'rHE AUTHOR, THE READER,
AND THE TEXT 
Copyright law rewards authors
21 
for their originality by grant­
ing them limited control over the creation and distribution of cop­
ies of their original expression.
25 
However, the very notion of cop­
yright protection recognizes that the progression of science and 
the arts is dependent upon dissemination of creative expression 
to the public.
2
G Creative expression, like so many human endeav­
ors, is essentially cumulative.
27 Every text is context, every author 
a copyist. These truths concerning the text and the author have 
remained at the margins of copyright law even as the artistic 
community has embraced them. For the arts, if not for the law, 
the reader has replaced the author as the focal point for deter­
mining textual meaning. In order to understand fair use, we must 
first parse the relationship of author, reader, and text. This rela­
tionship underlies fair use as it exists today
28 
and cries out for a 
new method of fair use analysis that acknowledges and explains 
24. This comment uses the terms "author," "reader," and "text" with the understand­
ing that "author" could refer to any maker of artistic expression (i.e., painters, sculptors, 
musicians), "reader" any consumer of artistic expression (i.e., viewers of paintings and 
movies), and "text" any artistic expression (i.e., songs, plays, dances). 
25. See Gary S. Lutzker, Dat's All Folhs: Cahn v. Sony and the Audio Horne Recording
Act of 1991-Merric Melodies or Looney 'Tunes?, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 145, 147 
(1992). 
26. See id.
27. See Carys J. Craig, Reconstructing the Author-Self: Sarne Feminist Lessons for
Copyright Law, 15 Ml. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 207, 265 (2007) (''There is no vacuum 
around the creative process, and no wall surrounding the author and her expression. With 
her original expression the creative author is entering a cultural conversation that has 
been going on Jong before she appeared, and one that will continue Jong after she leaves. 
Whatever she adds wilJ therefore incorporate and respond to that which has already been 
said; and she must trust that her contribution wilJ inform what others say after }Jer. In 
other words, the dialogic nature of authorship reveals the cumulative nature of cultural 
creativity."). 
28. See infra Part II. 
-
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how, given the right context, a reader may transform an author's 
text.
29 
A. The Author Is Dead. Long Live the Author!
In 1968 French linguist and philosopher, Roland Barthes, fa­
mously declared the author-as the creative genius who gives life 
and purpose to the artistic work-dead.30 This declaration was not 
meant to suggest that the author-person is no longer necessary, 
but rather that the notion of the author as the authority, the ex­
plicator, of his own work is outmoded.31 Every text is copied, an 
amalgamation of other texts, such that "it is language which 
speaks, not the author."32 
It has been argued that while the concept of the death of the 
author as promulgated by Barthes and others has had a profound 
impact on the study of literature, philosophy, and linguistics, 
33 
it 
has failed to have any noticeable impact on the legal understand­
ing of copyright.
34 
Whether post-structuralist theory has had any 
direct impact on copyright law, the observations made by Barthes 
and others still ring true. The author is not dead because a few 
French theorists and their students think it so, but rather be­
cause the notion of the author as authority over the text makes 
little sense. The text is understood by the reader, who becomes 
the authority of the text in the act of reading.35 It is in the reader 
where meaning must reside.
36 
Whether courts realize it or not, the 
29. See infra Part III.
30. ROLAND BARTHES, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE-MUSIC-TEXT 142, 148 (Ste­
phen Heath trans., 1977); see Craig, supra note 27, at 216. 
31. See Elton Fukumoto, Comment, The Author Effect after the "Death of the Author":
Copyright in a Postmodern Age, 72 WASH. L. REV. 903, 914 (1997) (discussing how authors 
have been replaced with text and how text is no longer limited by the figure of the author). 
32. BARTHES, supra note 30, at 143.
33. See, e.g., Lionel Bently, Review, Copyright and the Death of the Author in Litera­
ture and Law, 57 Mou. L. REV. 973, 974, 977 (1994); Michel Foucault, What Is an Author?, 
in TEX'rUAL STRATEGIES: PERSPECTIVES IN POST-STRUCTURALIST CRITICISM 141-42 (Josue 
V. Harari ed., 1979).
34. See Bently, supra note 33, at 977.
35. See BARTHES, supra note 30, at 148.
36. See id. ("Thus is revealed the total existence of writing: a text is made up of multi­
ple writings, drawn from many cultures and entering into mutual relations of dialogue, 
parody, contestation, but there is one place where this multiplicity is focused and that 
place is the reader, not, as was hitherto said, the author . ... [A] text's unity lies not in its 
origin but in its destination."). 
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concept of the death of the author meshes with copyright law re­
markably well precisely because the goal of promoting progress in 
science and the arts recognizes the ascendancy of the text and the 
reader over the author. 
B. The Author Is Subordinate to the Reader and the Text in
Copyright Law
Though the metes and bounds of copyright law are laid down in 
the Copyright Act of 1976,37 the ultimate legal authority for 
American copyright law derives from the United States Constitu­
tion, which grants Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au­
thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ­
ings and Discoveries."
38 
While at first glance this language seems 
to have the goal of promoting the rights of authors with respect to 
copyright and inventors with respect to patents, upon closer read­
ing these rights must instead be understood as a means to an 
end, which is the promotion of "the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts."
39 
Once a work is disseminated, progress no longer depends 
on the author but instead on the reader, the potential future au­
thor. 
Copyright law values future creation over past creation.
40 
Au­
thors have no natural property right in their works; instead, the 
government, through the Constitution and the Copyright Act, al­
lows them certain limited rights for a certain limited time in or­
der to promote artistic innovation at large.
11 
The artificial rights 
granted to authors are meant to encourage the creation of art, or 
rather, more accurately, to not discourage its creation-the 
37. See 17 U.S.C § 106 (2012) (setting forth the rights of a copyright owner). 
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
39. Id.
40. See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1262 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(noting that "copyright law promotes O public access to new ideas and concepts"). 
41. See id. at 1263 ("In a society oriented toward property ownership, it is not surpris­
ing to find many that erroneously equate the work with the copyright in the work and con­
clude that if one owns the copyright, they must also own the work. However, the fallacy of 
that understanding is exposed by the simple fact that the work continues to exist after the 
term of the copyright associated with the work has expired. 'The copyright is not a natural 
right inherent in authorship. If it were, the impact on market values would be irrelevant; 
any unauthorized taking would be obnoxious."') (quoting Leval, supra note 18, at ly.24). 
--
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thought being that, without some sort of reward, much creative 
expression might never come into existence.
42 
While the rights afforded to authors have been extended and 
43 
strengthened over the past few decades, many of these changes 
have come within the context of the new global marketplace and 
the necessity of "bring[ing] U.S. copyright law into compliance 
with the minimum standards set forth in the Berne Convention," 
the international agreement governing copyright.
44 
Furthermore, 
the goal of U.S. copyright law has not changed-authors are still 
allowed certain limited rights for a certain period of time in order 
"[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." 15 The 
rights afforded to authors are ensured by U.S. law only in order 
to promote new creative expression, new texts, for consumption 
by readers. 16 In this way copyright law recognizes that all creative 
expression is to some degree an act of appropriation. 
C. Richard Prince, Appropriation Artist
Richard Prince first gained the attention of the world in the 
1980s with his series of cowboy images which were in reality re­
photographs of various well-known Marlboro advertisements, fea­
turing the iconic Marlboro Man.·
17 
The difference between the orig­
inal advertisements and Prince's re-photographs were negligible 
other than the size and the removal of advertising copy.18 The ma­
jor difference was that Prince's re-photographs were available for 
sale and routinely commanded hundreds of thousands of dollars 
42. See id. at 1262 ("[T]he Copyright Clause grants the author limited exclusive rights
in order to encourage the creation of original works."). 
43. See e.g., ROBER'!' P. MERGES, PETER 8. MENELL & MARKA. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 433 (6th ed. 2012) (stating that since the 
Copyright Act was enacted in 1976, the duration of copyright protection has increased 
from the life of the author plus fifty years to the life of the author plus seventy years). 
44. Id.
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
46. SunTrust Banh, 268 F.3d at 1262.
47. Anthony R. Enriquez, The Destructive Impulse of Fair Use After Cariou v. Prince,
24 DEPAULJ. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 23-24 (2013). 
48. Richard Dorment, Richard Prince: The Coolest Artist Alive, TELEGRAPH (July 15,
2008, 12:01 AM), http://www.telegraph.co. uk/culture/art/35564 77/Richard-Prince-the­
coolest-artist-alive.html. 
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each (and recently, even more). 19 In fact, many of the photographs 
that have sold for some of the highest prices at auctions and gal­
leries over the past three decades have been re-photographs tak­
en by Prince.
50 
Despite decades of appropriation, it was not until 2011 that 
Richard Prince's art became the business of the courts when pho­
tographer Patrick Cariou sued Prince after discovering that he 
had appropriated various photographs Cariou had published 
years earlier in his book Yes Rasta.
51 While Cariou's book and the 
photographs had gone largely unnoticed,
52 New York's prominent 
Gagosian Gallery was featuring Prince's series Canal Zone, into 
which Cariou's photographs had been incorporated, selling eight 
of the pieces for a total of $10,480,000.
53 The district court ruled 
for Cariou over Prince's defense of fair use, finding that the ap­
propriation did not qualify as fair use because the use did not 
comment on the original work of art (or seemingly anything as far 
as the court could tell).
51 
In 2011, while his appeal of the Cariou decision was still in 
progress, Richard Prince printed and released The Catcher in the 
Rye in an edition of 500 copies.55 Prince's The Catcher in the Rye 
was arguably his boldest appropriation yet, in part because of the 
author whose text he had appropriated, but even more so because 
of the manner and scope of his appropriation.
5
G Prince went out of
his way to make plain the degree of his appropriation, taking the 
entire Salinger text and even using the same dust jacket art from 
49. In fact one of Prince's re-photographs of a Marlboro advertisement sold for $3.4
million, a record for a photograph at a Sotheby's sale in November of 2007. Brian Appel, 
Stealing from the Marlboro Man-Richard Prince's $3.4M Cowboy Re-'l'ahes Top Photog­
raphy Spot at the Fall Contemporary Auctions in New Yorh, BRIAN APPEL ART 
CHIT! CISM/ ART CONSULTING, http://www. briana ppelart.com/art_ writing_richard_prince_ 
stealing_from_the_marlboro_man.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
50. See id.
51. Sec Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 698 (2d Cir. 2013).
52. Id. at 709 (noting that Cariou earned approximately $8000 in royalties from Yes
Rasta). 
53. See id. at 698, 709.
54. See Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 348-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
55. See Hawk, supra note 2.
56. See Goldsmith, supra note 1. As mentioned above, Salinger has been extremely
protective of his copyright. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text; see also O'Neill, 
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early editions of The Catcher in the Rye with its iconic red carou­
sel horse. 
57 
Given that Prince's The Catcher in the Rye is so overwhelming­
ly similar to Salinger's, it is tempting to simply label it a pirated 
copy or a forgery and move on. However, this could not be farther 
from the truth. It is not a pirated copy because it is not trying to 
pass itself off as a legitimate Salinger The Catcher in the Rye.
68 
And it is difficult to claim Prince's book is a forgery because of the 
fame of Salinger's book-that is, it is hard to imagine any reason­
able person believing that Prince could have been the original au­
thor of The Catcher in the Rye. Prince's text, his The Catcher in 
the Rye, is not simply the words of the novel itself but the context 
in which those words are consumed by the reader. That context 
incorporates everything that the reader sees and knows about 
both Salinger and Prince, along with the words of the text and 
the materials that make up the book. For the reader, the context 
of Prince's The Catcher in the Rye overlays Salinger's novel, aug­
menting and transforming the meaning of the original text. 
D. Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote
In 1939, decades before Richard Prince, the Copyright Act, or 
the concept of transformative use existed, the Argentinian Jorge 
Luis Borges wrote the short story Pierre Menard, Author of the 
Quixote, which illustrated the relationship between author, read­
er, and text by focusing on the transformation that occurs 
through contextual reading.
59 
The story takes the form of a fic­
tional piece of literary criticism in which the narrator explains 
and extols the creative output of one Pierre Menard, a twentieth 
century author whom the narrator knew personally.
60 
Menard's 
57. See Goldsmith, supra note 1. 
58. How could it not be trying to pass itself off as a legitimate Salinger The Catcher in
the Rye? Because it is Prince's name, not Salinger's, on the front of the cover, title page, 
and copyright page. See id. 
59. Jorge Luis Borges, Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote, in COLLECTED FICTIONS 
88, 88 (Andrew Hurley trans., Penguin Books 1998); Ficciones Characters, BooKI{AGS, 
http://www.bookrags.com/studyguide-ficciones/#gsc.tab=O (Apr. 3, 2015). 
60. Ficciones Characters, supra note 59. Pierre Menard never existed nor did any of
his works. Notes on "Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote," BEHOLD MY SWARTHY FACE 
(May 12, 2008, 12:33 AM), http://www.beholdmyswarthyface.com/2008/05/on-pierre-men 
ard-author-of-quixote-by.html. 
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greatest ambition, it seems, was to write the Quixote.
61 
That Mi­
guel de Cervantes had already written it 250 years earlier was of 
no matter; Menard was determined to produce it himself word for 
word.
62 
Even more astonishing than this, Menard intended to 
write the Quixote, not by copying it or by somehow channeling 
Cervantes, but by writing as himself, a quirky, twentieth century 
French author.
63 
According to the narrator, Menard seems to have 
succeeded. At one point in his encomium, the narrator compares 
Cervantes' Don Quixote to Menard's and finds the latter's very 
different from and far superior to the farmer's: 
Cervantes, for example, wrote the following (Part I, Chapter IX): 
... truth, whose mother is history, rival of time, depository of 
deeds, witness of the past, exemplar and adviser to the pre­
sent, and the future's counselor. 
This catalog of attributes, written in the seventeenth century ... is 
mere rhetorical praise of history. Menard, on the other hand, writes: 
... truth, whose mother is history, rival of time, depository of 
deeds, witness of the past, exemplar and adviser to the pre­
sent, and the future's counselor. 
History, the mother of truth!-the idea is staggering. Menard, a con­
temporary of William James, defines history not as delving into real­
ity but as the very fount of reality. 
61 
According to the narrator, the genius of Menard's Don Quixote 
derived from its context. Though Menard writes the same words 
as Cervantes, by presenting them as his own, he forces the narra­
tor to confront those words in a different context than he would 
Cervantes' original text.65 Laid over the Cervantes' Don Quixote, 
the narrator sees and reads the world of Menard (a twentieth 
century world). 
The reader of Borges' story may well be unable to suspend his 
disbelief enough to agree with the narrator. However, the student 
61. Borges, supra note 59, at 91. 
62. Id. ("Pierre Menard did not want to compose another Quixote ... he wanted to 
compose the Quixote. Nor, surely, need one be obliged to note that his goal was never a 
mechanical transcription of the original; he had no intention of copying it. His admirable 
ambition was to produce a number of pages which coincided-word for word and line for 
line-with those of Miguel de Cervantes."). 
63. See id. at 91-92. 
64. Id. at 94. 
65. Id. ("The Cervantes text and the Menard text are verbally identical, but the se­
cond is almost infinitely richer."). 
/ 
1304 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1293 
of copyright should take note that, if the story is to be believed,66 
and if Cervantes (somehow) maintained a valid copyright at the 
time of Menard's composition, Menard would not have infringed 
on that copyright. The Quixote as written by Menard would be an 
original creation and not a copy.67 
Regardless of his intent, Menard's composition would not quali­
fy as an example of appropriation art. Despite the fact that 
Menard appears to be very familiar with Cervantes and Don 
Quixote, he steadfastly denied copying.68 Either Menard is a liar/ 
forger or he is an independent creator. Appropriation art is a 
bald-faced act; the appropriation artist openly incorporates the 
texts he finds into his own text without consideration of author­
ship claims.
69 
Nonetheless, the Borges story does reveal the sur­
prising relationship between author, reader, and text that appro­
priation artists like Richard Prince seek to expose: that authors 
lose authority once the texts are on the page. In fact, authors be­
come little more than additional pieces of context for the consum­
er of art to interpret in the course of his reading. 
IL THE STATE OF FAIR USE 
For well over one hundred years, courts have implemented the 
doctrine of fair use to protect a certain degree of copying in order 
to promote the overall purpose of copyright-"to promote the Pro­
gress of Science and useful Arts."70 In keeping with the goals of 
copyright protection, to disseminate and to increase cultural 
knowledge and expression, fair use provides the courts with a 
way to ensure that authors who use the protected creative ex­
pressions of others may do so if their use leads to new works of 
• 71 
expression.
66. That is, that Menard did not copy Cervantes' Quixote but independently created a
literary double. See id. at 91. 
67. See Abraham Drassinower, Authorship as Public Address: On the Specificity of
Copyright Vis-a-Vis Patent and Trade-Mark, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 199, 216-17 & n.51. 
68. See Borges, supra note 59, at 91.
69. See Rachel Isabelle Butt, Appropriation Art and Fair Use, 25 Omo ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 1055, 1061 (2010). 
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575
(1994). 
71. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 250 (2d Cir. 2006) ("Copyright law thus must ad­
dress the inevitable tension between the property rights it establishes in creative 
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Since its development in the nineteenth century, the fair use 
doctrine has tracked the course of copyright law development, 
and it was codified into the Copyright Act of 1976.72 The statute 
lists four factors that courts must use in any fair use analysis: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purpos­
es; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of 73 the copyrighted work. 
Courts are reluctant to clarify and organize these factors out of 
concern that doing so would limit their discretion over fair use de­
terminations.11 This reluctance causes courts to maintain a form­
less mode of analysis in which the fair use factors have been ap­
plied haphazardly. What is more, in the last twenty-five years, 
the concept of transformative use has confused fair use analysis 
even further. The current state of fair use and its relationship to 
transformative use are quagmires that require explanations. 
A. Fair Use as (Mostly) 1'ransformative Use?
In 1990, Pierre Leval, a federal district court judge, wrote what 
has become a seminal article on copyright law, in which he 
pushed for a more standardized conception of the fair use doc­
trine. 75 Leval claimed that "Factor One is the soul of fair use," and 
that in reality, factor one is really asking whether a given use is 
transformative.
76 Though Leval argued that all four of the factors
are necessary to complete any fair use analysis, he also stated 
that the three final factors would necessarily vary in significance 
works ... and the ability of authors, artists, and the rest of us to express them-or our­
selves by reference to the works of others .... The fair-use doctrine mediates between the­
se two sets of interests, determining where each set of interests ceases to control."). 
72. See 17 U.S.C § 107 (2012).
73. Id.
74. See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705 (2d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted); Ca.mp­
bell, 510 U.S. at 577 (citations omitted). 
75. See genera.Uy Leval, supra. note 18, at 1105 (noting "that throughout the develop­
ment of the fair use doctrine, courts had failed to fashion a set of governing principles or 
values," while "[suggesting] that a cogent set of governing principles exists"). 
76. Id. at 1116. 
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depending on the strength of the transformative use determined 
under the first factor.77 
Leval's take on fair use and, particularly, the concept of trans­
formative use under the first factor, was itself transformed into 
legal precedent by the Supreme Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music in 1994.78 However, the first factor has not always been 
considered the most important of the four. Despite the powerful 
influence of Leval's article and the Supreme Court's decision in 
Campbell, some courts continue to agree with the earlier Su­
preme Court decision in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Na­
tions, 79 in which the Court stated that the "last factor is undoubt­
edly the single most important element of fair use."
80 
Nonetheless,
in the years since the Campbell decision, most courts have taken 
an "expansive view of transformative use" and frequently found 
that it can "essentially overwhelm all the [other] factors."
81 
B. Fair Use and Transformative Use in (and After) Cariou v.
Prince
The Second Circuit's decision in Cariou v. Prince represents the 
most current distillation of the role transformation plays in fair 
use determinations.
82 In this case, the court found that Prince's 
use of the Cariou photographs was transformative
83 
and therefore 
fair because that use added value to the original photographs by 
employing them for a different purpose.8·
1 
Though the Second Cir-
77. See id.
78. 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) ("(T]he goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts,
is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such works thus lie at the 
heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copy­
right, and the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of the 
other factors . . .  that may weigh against a finding of fair use.") (internal citations omit­
ted). 
79. See, e.g., Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014) ("We
think it best to stick with the statutory list, of which the most important usually is the 
fourth (market effect)."). 
80. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
81. Barry Werbin & Jessica D. Wessel, The 'Transformation' of Fair Use After Prince
v. Cariou, MONDAQ, http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/292912/Copyright/'l'he+Tran
sfo�mation+of+Fair+Use+After+Prince+v+Cariou (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
82. See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).
83. The court found the use transformative in twenty-five out of thirty works. Id. at
706. On the remaining five works, it remanded the case to the district court for a finding
consistent with its opinion. Id. at 712.
84. Se id. at 705-06.
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cuit's emphasis on transformative use seems a step in the right 
direction, it is not without its detractors. In its 2014 decision in 
Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, the Seventh Circuit criticized the 
Cariou court for replacing the four factors with the notion of 
transformative use.85 These two cases highlight the current mis­
understanding of the concept of transformative use as it relates to 
the four factors listed in 17 U.S.C. § 106. By considering the four 
factors together as indicators of transformation and not as dis­
crete inquiries, courts could significantly reduce this confusion. 
In the course of his legal defense, Richard Prince never disput­
ed that he had appropriated and used Patrick Cariou's copyright­
ed work.
86 
As an appropriation artist, he made no effort to conceal 
his "theft" nor felt he had any reason to do so.87 Prince did, how­
ever, mount a fair use defense.88 Though the district court roundly 
rejected Prince's fair use defense, the Second Circuit largely ac­
cepted it when it considered the case on appeal in 2013.
89 The Se­
cond Circuit mainly disagreed with the district court over the ap­
plication of the first of the four factors in the fair use analysis. 
While the district court "imposed a requirement that, to qualify 
for a fair use defense, a secondary use must 'comment on, relate 
to the historical context of, or critically refer back to the original 
works,"' the Second Circuit disagreed.90 While it acknowledged 
that often times fair use will come in the form of a reflexive com­
mentary-especially when it involves satire or parody-the Se­
cond Circuit found the requirement that a use come in that form 
in order to qualify as transformative was incorrect.
01 Instead, the 
85. See 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014). This is an extreme and unfair criticism on
the part of the Seventh Circuit. While the Second Circuit certainly emphasized transform­
ative use in Cariou, it still only treated it under factor one of the four factor test. Cariou, 
714 F.3d at 708-10. Though the court subordinated the other factors to factor one and 
transformative use, it still considered all four in its analysis. Id. 
86. Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
87. See Interview by Karen Rosenberg with Richard Prince, N.Y. MAG. (May 2, 2005),
available at http://nymag.com/nymetro/arts/art/11815/ (referring to images he might like 
to appropriate Prince remarked, "Every week, I'd see one and be like, 'Oh, that's mine. 
Thank you."') (emphasis added). 
88. Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 342.
89. See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 698-99.
90. Id. at 706 (quoting Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 348).
91. Id.
/ 
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secondary use must merely "alter the original with 'new expres­
sion, meaning, or message"' without simply repackaging or re-
• • 9') castmg 1t. 
In order to determine whether a new message, meaning, or ex­
pression has been created in the secondary work, the court must 
first look at the original and secondary works side by side. 93 A 
simple comparison of their aesthetics might suffice to show that a 
different message or a different purpose is being expressed de­
spite the use of the same materials.91 In Cariou, the Second Cir­
cuit found that this eyeball test revealed that there were dra­
matic differences of aesthetics between Cariou's originals and 
their Prince counterparts in twenty-five out of thirty of the piec­
es.% In short, the Second Circuit determined that, while criticism 
and commentary on the original could qualify as transformative 
use (and therefore fair use), they were not requirements.% In­
stead, all that was required was actual transformation of the 
• 97 meanmg or message. 
In its analysis, the district court relied heavily on Prince to ex­
plain the message of his art and found that he was unable to ar­
ticulate a clear purpose for his use of Cariou's photographs.98 The 
Second Circuit once again thought the district court missed the 
mark in emphasizing the role of the author in determining the 
meaning of his own work.99 Perhaps unknowingly influenced by 
Barthes and other poststructuralists, the court found what was 
essential to determining that purpose was not the explication of 
the artist but rather "how the work in question appears to the 
reasonable observer."100 The Second Circuit interestingly shifted 
92. Id. (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).
93. See id. at 706-08.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 706 ("Prince's composition, presentation, scale, color palette, and media are
fundamentally different and new compared to the [Cariou] photographs, as is the expres­
sive nature of Prince's work."). 
96. Id.
97. See id.
98. Id. at 707 ("[W]hat I [Prince] do is I completely try to change it into something
that's completely different ... I'm trying to make a kind of fantastic, absolutely hip, up to 
date, contemporary take on the music scene.") (quoting Prince Dep. 338:4-339:3, Oct. 6, 
2009). 
99. See id.
100. See id.; cf. BARTHES, supra note 30, at 148 ("[A] text is made of multiple writ­
ings ... but there is one place where this multiplicity is focused and that place is the read-
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the inquiry from intention to perception and from the author to 
the reader. By doing so, the court made a significant change to 
the process of finding transformative use. 
In a telling move, the Second Circuit next analyzed the Prince 
Canal Zone works under the fourth fair use factor,101 again find­
ing that the district court had focused its attention in the wrong 
place.102 The point of the fourth factor, according to the Second 
Circuit, was not to determine whether the secondary use sup­
pressed or destroyed the market for the original (say by damaging 
the original artist's reputation), "but whether the secondary use 
usurps the market of the original work."103 In order to usurp the 
market of the original, the court reasoned that the secondary 
work must hijack the likely audience of the original work by pre­
senting that audience with the same content as that original 
work.Jo.,
Because Prince's market for his Canal Zone pieces was com­
pletely different from Cariou's market for his Yes Rasta photo­
graphs, the court found that there was no way that Prince could 
have been said to have usurped the market (even the derivative 
market) for Cariou's work.105 The potential audience and likely 
consumers of Prince's Canal Zone were the rich, sophisticated col­
lectors who were wined and dined at the Gagosian Gallery. JoG 
Whereas Cariou published his photographs in book form, sold a 
few prints to close friends, and hardly marketed his work at all, 
making just over $8000, Prince sold eight of his works for a total 
of $10,480,000 and the opening of his show was attended by a 
who's who of the rich and famous, including Jay-Z, Beyonce, Tom 
Brady, Gisele Bi.indchen, Jonathan Franzen, Candance Bushnell, 
Robert DeNiro, Brad Pitt, and Angelina Jolie.107 It simply does not 
er, not, as was hitherto said, the author."). 
101. This is "telling'' because the court is revealing what has long been the thinking of
the courts-that the focus of the fair use analysis should be on either the first factor, the 
fourth factor, or both, and not on the middle two factors. 
102. See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 708.
103. Id. (quoting Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 258 (2d Cir. 2006)).
104. Id. at 709.
105. See id.
106. See id. The Gagosian Gallery is the gallery where Prince exhibited and sold his
Canal Zone pieces. Richard Prince Canal Zone, GAGOSIAN GALLERY, http://www.gagosian. 
com/exhibitions/richard-prince--may-08-2014 (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
107. See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 709.
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take much imagination to see that, forgetting the respective artis­
tic merits of the Yes Rasta and Canal Zone pieces, the market for 
the relatively unknown Patrick Cariou was very different from 
that of the famous and notorious Richard Prince whose previous 
work, by the time of this show, held the record for the highest re­
alized price of any photograph in history. 10
8 Prince's fame ensured
that his work could reach a market that Cariou simply could not. 
The Second Circuit rounded out its analysis with brief consid­
eration of the second and third fair use factors-the nature of the 
copyrighted work (factor two) and the amount and substantiality 
of the work that is used (factor three). 109 It acknowledged that the
second factor was designed to make it more difficult to find fair 
use when the original work was of a highly creative nature.11
0 
Although Cariou's photographs were just the sort of highly crea­
tive works that copyright law is designed to protect, the court 
shrugged this off, finding this factor of limited help when the sec­
ondary use has already been shown to be transformative. 1
11 
The
court gave the third fair use factor similar treatment, finding that 
however much the secondary work takes from the original, so 
long as the use is transformative, the factor must nonetheless 
weigh in favor of fair use. 112 
Ultimately, in determining that the use of Cariou's photo­
graphs in twenty-five out of thirty of Prince's Canal Zone pieces 
qualified as fair use, the Second Circuit focused on two issues: (1) 
the transformative use of the photographs (the first fair use fac­
tor) and (2) the fact that the secondary works did not usurp the 
market of the originals (the fourth fair use factor).11
3 
While the 
court considered all four of the factors demanded by the Copy­
right Act, in its analysis it misunderstood how the four factors re­
late to each other and how they all (not just the first factor) help 
reveal the role of transformative use in a finding of fair use. 
The general confusion over fair use was again on display in a 
subsequent decision by the Seventh Circuit in 2014, wherein the 
108. See Appel, supra note 49.
109. See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 709-10.
110. See id. at 709.
111. See id. at 710.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 705-06, 709-10.
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court criticized the Second Circuit for improperly allowing a find­
ing of transformative use to usurp the role of the four factors in 
its Cariou v. Prince decision.11
4 
According to the Seventh Circuit, 
hearkening back to the Supreme Court's language in Harper & 
Row, all of the factors should be considered, with the fourth factor 
being the most important.115 Indeed, as far as the Seventh Circuit 
was concerned, transformative use. was "not one of the statutory 
factors" at all despite the significance that the Supreme Court 
seemed to place on it in Campbell.11
6 
This circuit split highlights the current confusion as to the in­
terrelationship of the four factors and the overall significance of 
transformative use. The problem is that each court is right and 
each court is wrong. The Kienitz court correctly points out that 
transformative use is not one of the four statutory factors which 
must be considered in any fair use analysis. 117 However, the court 
does not recognize that transformative use is the unifying theme 
behind those factors, the question that they help to resolve, and 
the sine qua non of fair use. The Cariou court understands that 
transformative use is essential but misunderstands its place in 
the analysis. The court considers it only under the first factor and 
then systematically marginalizes the other factors without realiz­
ing that they are necessary to understanding the nature and ex­
tent of the transformative use at issue. This confusion can be 
remedied by the two-step method for analyzing fair use described 
below that harmonizes the four factors and clarifies their rela­
tionship to transformative use. 
III. THE FUTURE OF FAIR USE
Though allowing the courts broad discretion to find fair use 
makes sense considering the rich variety of creative expression 
mankind is capable of, a standardized process for determining 
fair use is necessary in order to uphold the purpose of copyright­
the progress of science and the arts. The current methods of fair 
114. See Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014).
115. See id. at 758; Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 589, 566
(1985). 
116. See Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 758; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579
(1994). 
117. Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 758.
/ 
1312 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49: 1293 
use analysis are confusing and have led to incompatible rulings. 
The method itself may be standardized without undermining the 
courts discretion within that method. Fair use should be deter­
mined by considering the four factors as reorganized into two 
questions: (1) How transformative is a given use? and (2) Is that 
use transformative enough in a given case to be considered fair 
use? An analysis of Richard Prince's complete appropriation of 
Salinger's The Catcher in the Rye, a seemingly extreme example 
of what might be considered fair use, serves well as a template for 
applying this proposed method. 
A. Transforming Fair Use
First and foremost, all use is transformative. Copyright law 
has danced around this idea ever since the fair use doctrine was 
articulated without directly proclaiming it.11
8 
Courts have long
recognized that "[t]he thoughts of every man are, more or less, a 
combination of what other men have thought and expressed, alt­
hough they may be modified, exalted, or improved by his own ge­
nius or reflection."119 Barthes' concept of the text as a web of in­
terconnected texts, drawn from language and culture, is not new 
to copyright law.1
20 
To a degree, it has always been there. The fair
use doctrine recognizes this by allowing authors who have incor­
porated copied creative expression into their works an opportuni­
ty to show that their copying is not at odds with the goal of copy­
right-the progress of science and art. 
121 
Given that all use is transformative, the four factors may now 
be understood as signposts for determining the extent of the 
transformation that has occurred and, ultimately, whether that 
transformation has removed the secondary work from the market 
of the original. To that end, rather than wandering through the 
four factors, occasionally conflating them, overemphasizing one 
and disregarding another, courts should apply a standard prac-
118. See Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (1845) ("In truth, in literature, in sci­
ence and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things, which, in an abstract sense, are 
strictly new and original throughout."). 
119. Id.
120. See id. (discussing the manner in which all books borrow from elsewhere); see also
BARTHES, supra note 30, at 148 ("[A] text is made of multiple writings, drawn from many 
cultures and entering into mutual relations of dialogue, parody, contestation .... "). 
121. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); supra Part LB. 
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tice to their application. This can be accomplished by changing 
the stratagem for fair use analysis from a four factor pick-and­
choose into a methodical two-step process. A court should first 
ask how transformative the use is. In answering that question, it 
should consider the amount and significance of the material used 
(factor three) and the purpose of the use (factor one). 
122 A court
should then ask whether that use is transformative enough in the 
work in question to qualify as fair use. In answering that ques­
tion, it should consider the nature of the copyrighted work (factor 
two) and whether the use has allowed the secondary work to 
usurp the potential market of the copyrighted work (factor 
four).123
Additionally, when determining the purpose of the use under 
the first question, the courts should follow the example of the Se­
cond Circuit in Cariou v. Prince and not concern itself with the
motivations of the author but instead with the observer's percep­
tion of the use's purpose.121 However, rather than the general rea­
sonable observer standard set forth in Cariou, the court should
consider the purpose of the use from the perspective of a reasona­
ble consumer of the allegedly infringing worh.125 In this way, the
court can limit the analysis to the likely audience of the text ra­
ther than the reasonable public at large. After all, it is the con­
sumer of any given creative expression, the reader of a text, who 
is actually interpreting and understanding it.
126
B. From The Catcher in the Rye to The Catcher in the Rye
As of this writing, the Salinger estate has taken no legal action
against Richard Prince for his appropriation of The Catcher in the
Rye. 121 It may never. After all, Richard Prince only produced 500
122. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
12 3. See id.; Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 708-09 (2d Cir. 201 3) (finding that the
fourth factor is really about whether the secondary use usurps the market of the original). 
124. See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707.
125. See id. ("What is critical is how the work in question appears to the reasonable
observer .... "). 
126. See BARTHES, supra note 30, at 148.
127. See Goldsmith, supra note 1 ("Price [sic] is openly pirating what is arguably the
most valuable literary property [in] American literature, practically begging the estate of 
Salinger to sue him."). 
/ 
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copies.
128 
As many of the copies have disappeared into collections 
and the secondary market, 129 an injunction would be somewhat 
unhelpful.
130 
Damages or some sort of reasonable royalties might 
be possible, but it may not be worth it to the estate considering 
the retail prices of the Prince copies.
131 
Nonetheless, an analysis of 
such a blatant appropriation of such a renowned creative work 
under the proposed two question fair use analysis described below 
illustrates the helpfulness of the process. 
1. How Transformative Is Richard Prince's Use of J.D. Salinger's
The Catcher in the Rye?
In order to understand the extent of the transformative use of 
The Catcher in the Rye, we must determine (1) the amount and 
significance of the portion used and (2) the purpose of the use.
132 
Richard Prince appropriated every word of the text of Salin­
ger's novel in the making of his The Catcher in the Rye. Prince 
additionally used the same dust jacket art and used materials de­
signed to mimic an early edition of Salinger's novel, hijacking the 
context of the book as an object. 
133 
Under the first consideration, it 
128. Michael Lieberman, Richard Prince: Book Pirate?, BOOK PATROL (Apr. 23, 2012),
http://bookpatrol.net/richard-prince-book-pirate/. 
129. On the popular used and rare book marketplace abebooks.com, as of this writing,
unsigned copies of Prince's The Catcher in the Rye start at $1500. See Results for Richard 
Prince and The Catcher in the Rye, ABEBOOI<S.COM, http://abebooks.com/servlet/Search 
Results?an=richard+prince&sts=t&m=catcher+in+the+rye (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
130. Prince sold an unknown number of copies on the street in New York and still more
at a rare book convention; the rest remain in his archive. Kelly Crow, Artist Richard 
Prince's Secret Retreat, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/artist­
richard-princes-secret-retreat-1417536346. Prince seems to have stopped selling copies 
and keeps the unsold copies in his archive. See id. An injunction could reach these unsold 
copies, prevent Prince from reprinting his appropriation, and discourage third party sales 
on the secondary market. But still, Prince's The Catcher in the Rye is out in the world; an 
injunction is unlikely to change that. 
131. There is some question as to what constituted retail price for the Prince books.
Prince seems to have sold some on the street for forty dollars apiece on at least one occa­
sion. See Goldsmith, supra note 1. However, the price in the dust jacket was sixty-two dol­
lars, so some may have sold for that price. See Interview by Kim Gordon with Richard 
Prince, lNTERVmW MAG., av.ailable at http://www.interviewmagazine.com/art/kim-gordon­
richard-prince/# _ (quoting Prince as saying that he thought the price on the flap was sixty­
two dollars). 
132. See supra Part III.A; cf 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
133. See Goldsmith, supra note 1. Though the design of the book and jacket are not Sal­
inger's direct creative expressions, they are so heavily associated with the work that they 
must be considered as part of the context surrounding the text, though not ultimately as 
material copied from Salinger. 
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is hard to argue that Prince left a single creative expression 
alone. However, appropriating all of the creative expression of 
Salinger's The Catcher in the Rye does not weigh against Prince 
in determining the extent of his transformative use of the materi­
al. Instead, it lets us know where to look for transformation. 
Here, as Prince appropriated everything from the original, in the 
next step, we must look at the allegedly infringing text as a whole 
for transformation. 
Having determined that Prince appropriated everything from 
Salinger's The Catcher in the Rye, we must next determine the 
purpose of that complete use. In order to determine this purpose, 
we do not need to focus our attention on the purported meaning 
ascribed to the use by Prince. 
131 
Instead, we should consider how 
the use would appear to a reasonable, likely observer of that 
use. 
135 
While it is difficult to tell "how a presumably befuddled 
public might have responded" to Prince's work, 
136 those who know 
of Prince, and even appropriation art in general, would almost 
certainly recognize the use as "a new appropriation work ... so 
radical and so daring."
137 
This is largely because of the text that 
Prince is appropriating and the notoriety of Prince himself. 
Because of the sheer fame of Salinger's work, it is doubtful that 
any likely consumer of either Salinger or Prince would think that 
Prince's The Catcher in the Rye is the original novel. Salinger's 
The Catcher in the Rye is one of the bestselling and most recog­
nizable novels of all time.
138 
The mere presence of Prince's name 
134. See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 707 (2d Cir. 2013). As it happens, in an inter­
view with Kim Gordon, Prince did state a purpose for appropriating The Catcher in the 
Rye: 
Yeah, I just wanted to make sure, if you were going to buy my Catcher in the 
Rye, you were going to have to pay twice as much as the one Barnes and No­
ble was selling from J.D. Salinger. I know that sounds really kind of shallow, 
and maybe that's not the best way to contribute to something, but in the book 
collecting world you pay a premium for really collectible books. 
Interview by Kim Gordon with Richard Prince, supra note 131. Again, the purpose as ar­
ticulated by Prince is not what is important here. The purpose as interpreted by the read­
er is what matters. 
135. Cf. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707.
136. Goldsmith, supra note 1.
137. Id.
138. The novel has sold some sixty million copies and is widely known for its inclusion
on school required reading lists. Ed Grabianowski, The 21 Best-Selling Books of All Time, 
ENTrmTAINMENT: HowSTUFFWORKS, http://entertainment.howstuffworks.com/arts/litera 
ture/21-best-sellers.htm#page=15 (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (ranking The Catcher in the 
I 
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on the cover, title page, and (even) the copyright page of such a 
renowned novel reveals the purpose to be appropriation itself. 
The purpose of Prince's use is to comment on the nature of the 
authorship and copyright restrictions by appropriating one of the 
most famous and subversive novels of the twentieth century, a 
work by an author known to be protective of his copyright. 139 
By replacing Salinger's name with his own, Prince has radical­
ly transformed the text from a novel about the alienation of an 
adolescent from the hypocritical world in which he finds himself 
to a visual protest against the tyranny of authorship. Written 
over and into Salinger's text is Prince's creation of an object 
which, by its very existence, encapsulates a refusal to 
acknowledge authority-a refusal made all the more powerful 
considering Holden Caulfield's rejection of adult authority in the 
novel. 
110 Prince's The Catcher in the Rye as a piece of art reflects 
the rebellion exhibited in the novel back at Salinger and the pu.b­
lic at large. 
It is important to note that it is not simply Prince's notoriety as 
an appropriator of visual art, the novelty of his appropriation, 
Salinger's fame and obsession with privacy, or the novel's theme 
and reputation that reveals the purpose of the use here. Rather, 
it is the combination of all of these things. Prince's text is not 
simply the novel The Catcher in the Rye but also a sculpture (in 
the form of a book) which criticizes the hypocrisy of authority and 
copyright protectionism. It is the total appropriation of the Salin­
ger novel which gives life to this use. As such, the use of the novel 
as a whole is highly transformative. 
2. Is Prince's Use Transformative Enough in This Case to
Qualify as Fair Use?
In order to determine whether Prince's use is transformative 
enough in this particular case to qualify as fair use we must con­
sider: (1) the nature of the copyrighted work and (2) whether the 
Rye as the fifteenth bestselling book of all time). 
139. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
140. See Louis Menand, Holden at Fifty, NEW YORKER (Oct. 1, 2001), available at http:
//www.newyorker.com/magazine/2001/10/0l/holden-at-fifty. 
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use has allowed the secondary work to usurp the market of the 
copyrighted work. 111 
Salinger's The Catcher in the Rye is a highly creative work of 
expression that is exactly the sort of work copyright law was de­
signed to encourage. However, this does not mean that use of it 
cannot be fair. The nature of the copyrighted work helps to de­
termine what its market is and where it rests in the cultural 
world. As an extremely popular and highly original novel, its 
markets and derivative markets are easy enough to determine: 
sales of the novel itself, potential sequels, movies, facsimile edi­
tions, etc. 
While the first consideration, the nature of the copyrighted 
work, helps to determine the market for the original, the second 
consideration asks us to decide whether the transformative use 
allows the secondary work to usurp the market of the original. 
Under this analysis some concerns arise-namely whether the 
Prince work usurps the facsimile market for the original and 
whether it usurps the regular book market for the original. 
It is easy to dispense with the concern about the market for 
facsimile editions. Prince has made a near copy of an early edi­
tion; still, it is not a facsimile edition for the simple reason that a 
facsimile edition is a complete copy of a book including the words 
of the novel and the original points of issue for the book.
1
12 A fac­
simile edition perfectly copies the book as a whole, not just the 
text of the novel. By adding his name to the cover, title, and copy­
right pages (as well as changing the publishing information on 
the copyright page), Prince has prevented his work from usurping 
the facsimile market for the original because it is not a perfect 
copy of any edition of The Catcher in the Rye. 
The second concern for market usurpation is somewhat more at 
issue here. After all, Prince was out on the sidewalk in New York 
141. See supra Part III.A. 
142. Facsimile Editions, ABEB00KS.C0M, http://www.abebooks.com/books/RareDooks/ 
collection-expensive-reprint-publisher/facsimile-editions.shtml (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
A point of issue is a bibliographic indicator of a certain edition. See How to Establish the 
Value of a Booh, FEDPO.C0M, www.fedpo.com (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). For instance, 
very early printings of The Catcher in the Rye have a photograph of Salinger on the rear 
panel of the dust jacket. See First Edition Criteria and Points to Identify The Catcher and 
the Rye by J.D. Salinger, supra note 2. This was dropped in later printings and as such is 
a point of issue for certain early printings of the work. See id. 
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selling his copies of the work for forty dollars apiece, a price not 
all that different from what a new hardcover copy of Salinger's 
The Catcher in the Rye might command.w It might seem reasona­
ble that a person wanting to read the original could just as easily 
purchase a Prince copy. However, this is unlikely. A typical read­
er, unfamiliar with appropriation art and Richard Prince, who 
wants to read The Catcher in the Rye by J.D. Salinger is unlikely 
to purchase a copy of The Catcher in the Rye by Richard Prince. 
Such a person would not believe two books by different authors 
would have the same text. The market for Prince's The Catcher in 
the Rye is not the reading public or the Salinger collector, but ra­
ther the collector of appropriation art or bibliographic oddities. 
Prince's work is unlikely to replace Salinger's in the novel reading 
market and/or its derivative markets and therefore does not 
usurp the market for the original work. 
As the transformative use of Salinger's complete novel has re­
moved Prince's The Catcher in the Rye from the market for the 
original, that transformative use must qualify as fair use under 
the analysis. Therefore, Richard Prince's The Catcher in the Rye 
does not infringe on J.D. Salinger's The Catcher in the Rye. 
CONCLUSION 
Though courts have long had all the pieces of the fair use doc­
trine, the analyses have shown a remarkable degree of confusion 
over the years. Courts have consistently misunderstood the role 
of transformative use and its relationship to the four factors the 
Copyright Act requires for consideration in any fair use determi­
nation. If all art is cumulative and all expression is in some way 
copied, courts must be very careful in their determinations of 
what does and does not constitute fair use. It is the last line of de­
fense against infringement; the final protection not only for the 
allegedly infringing work but also for all the possible works it 
might influence. With their uneven applications of the four fair 
143. The copy could command this price if Salinger's estate allowed it to be reprinted in
hardcover. See generally Price and Inflation Data for Selected Library Materials 2014, 
STATF� LIB. OF IOWA, www.statelibraryofiowa.org/ld/a-b/books/resources/bookinflation (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2015) (showing that the average price of a hardcover novel in 2013 was 
$30.18). 
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use factors, the courts have endangered the progress of the sci­
ence and the arts. 
In order to clarify and organize the process of finding fair use, 
this comment suggests structuring the four factor test into a two­
part analysis that asks: (1) how transformative a given use is and 
(2) whether that use is transformative enough to qualify as fair
use in a given case. By providing a solid structure for applying
the four factors and clarifying the role transformative use plays
in every fair use analysis, courts can ensure that the ultimate
purpose of copyright is not sacrificed on the altar of the author's
rights. As seen in Richard Prince's total appropriation of J.D. Sal­
inger's The Catcher in the Rye, even complete copying can be fair
use if that copying transforms the original enough contextually in
the minds of its readers.
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